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Abstract. We build a simple model of trust as an equilibrium phenomenon,
departing from standard \selsh" preferences in a minimal way. Agents who are on the
receiving end of an oer to transact can choose whether to cheat and take away the
entire surplus, taking into account a \cost of cheating." The latter has an idiosyncratic
component (an agent's type), and a socially determined one. The smaller the mass of
agents who cheat, the larger the cost of cheating suered by those who cheat.
Depending on the parameter values, the model can have a unique equilibrium level
of trust (the proportion of transactions not cheated on), or two equilibria, one with
high and the other with low trust. Thus, dierences in trust levels across societies can
reect dierent fundamentals or, for the same fundamentals, a switch across multiple
equilibria. Surprisingly, we nd that these two possibilities are partially identiable
from an empirical point of view.
Our model can also be reinterpreted as one with standard selsh preferences and
an enforcement agency with limited resources that are used to catch and ne a subset
of those who cheat. Lastly, we carry out a robustness exercise in which agents learn
in a simple way from experience about how many agents cheat in society. Our results
indicate that when there are multiple equilibria the high trust equilibrium is less robust
than the low trust one.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and Overview
Not many transactions are carried out using rotating security trays with money on one
side and the purchased good on the other. Yet, without these devices or some equivalent
arrangement the standard selsh agents that populate modern economic models would be
unable to trade, barring repeated interaction or binding contracts. It is instead self-evident
that trade among agents ourishes way beyond what this hypothetical world would look like.
The lubricant that makes so many transactions take place is trust. This is the belief that
economic agents hold that the other side of the transaction will not behave in a completely
opportunistic way, thus impeding mutually advantageous exchange.1
Our purpose here is to build a simple model of trust as an equilibrium phenomenon. The
agents' beliefs about the probability of not being cheated | their level of trust as we just
dened it | should be endogenously determined in equilibrium, and hence correct. The
reason we focus on beliefs is simple. There is a basic tension between \trusting beliefs,"
and consequent \trusting behavior," and the incentives to cheat of other agents in society.
Trusting beliefs can be exploited. However, a trustful agent should not be cheated often; if
she is, she should change her belief and start trusting less. This tension seems to warrant a
close examination of what an equilibrium model of trust can generate.
To model trust we place a \cost of cheating" in the agents' utility function (this is our
sole departure from the standard purely-selsh agents paradigm). The cost of cheating has
two components. One which is an exogenous characteristic of each agent, and another which
is socially determined by the behavior of others. The less common cheating behavior is in
society, the higher is the cost of cheating for individual agents. This feedback component
of the cost of cheating is a central ingredient of our analysis, and we return to it at length
below.
While we insist that trust should emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon in our model, we
do not intend to dismiss \behavioral traits" and non-equilibrium factors in the explanation of
trust as a belief. Rather, by investigating whether a successful model of trust in a society can
be built along standard lines we hope to shed light on whether, and if so which, departures
from the standard paradigm in the agents' belief formation are needed to address the issue
1A large literature exists on the sources and eects of the presence of trust. For ease of exposition, we
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of trust. This may eventually lead to an understanding of how important the new behavioral
traits are in interpreting reality.
Our model is deliberately kept simple in the extreme. In particular, our model is not
dynamic. Although repeated interactions have been used very successfully to generate \co-
operative behavior" of many kinds, our initial motivation as above is to have a model of trust
that applies to situations that would seem to call for \swivel-tray trading" if trust were not
present. Hence, we stay deliberately clear of reputational issues and more generally of re-
peated interaction ingredients in our set up. As well as making our analysis more transparent,
this way of proceeding makes our results immune from the price that many dynamic models
have to pay. Multiplicity of equilibria (although it features prominently in our analysis) is
not an issue for us. While dynamic models are often plagued by a staggering multiplicity of
equilibria that dramatically curtails their predictive ability, we are able to proceed with only
a very mild simplifying assumption in this respect.
In spite of its extreme simplicity, our set up provides a rich enough framework to address,
in an interesting and novel way, the well documented diversity of levels of trust in dierent
societies.2 Indeed, depending on the conguration of preference and other parameters, our
model either generates a unique equilibrium (with a single equilibrium level of trust), or two
equilibria, one with a higher and another with a lower level of trust. Moreover, by varying the
parameters of the model, higher or lower levels of equilibrium trust can be obtained without
switching across dierent equilibria. Given this rich set of possible equilibrium outcomes, the
model allows us to frame in a natural way an important question on the observed diversity
of levels of trust in dierent societies. Are two societies, one with a high level of trust and
another with a lower one, dierent because their fundamental parameters dier, or because,
given same fundamental parameters, they happen to be in dierent equilibria? Obviously
these two possibilities have dierent policy implications, as it is likely easier to shift from one
equilibrium to another for given fundamentals than it is to induce a change in the fundamental
parameters.
A key insight from our model is that the two cases are in fact partially identiable in terms
of the outcomes they generate. A stark prediction of our analysis is that if dierent levels of
trust result from multiple equilibria, then the level of trust must be negatively correlated with
the size of individual transactions. A positive correlation can only emerge if dierent levels
2As opposed to heterogeneity of behavior within a society, which is not our direct focus of attention,
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of trust were to result from dierences in the parameters of the model.3 To our knowledge,
the possibility to empirically disentangle multiple vs. unique equilibrium regimes is new.
A second set of results concerns the relationship between levels of trust and measures of
economic performance. While the level of trust correlates positively with a measure of overall
activity in the economy, the link between level of trust and welfare (inclusive of the perceived
costs associated with cheating) is ambiguous. Though our model is much too simple to
take welfare measures as other than qualitative, we nd this dierence interesting and worth
exploring in more detailed models.
A third batch of results concerns the fact that the social feedback on the cost of cheating
outlined above can be re-interpreted as resulting from an enforcement technology whose
eectiveness depends on the average behavior. We nd that, in the multiple equilibria regime,
an innitesimal increase in the resources devoted to enforcement can yield a discontinuous
increase in the level of total activity in the economy (the eect on welfare is ambiguous, due
to our third result). In the single equilibrium regime, instead, the level of activity changes
continuously with the resources spent in the enforcement technology.
A fourth batch of results that emerges from our analysis is that, in the multiple equilibria
regime, the low-trust equilibrium is more robust than the high-trust one in a well specied
sense. Roughly, small deviations from the high-trust equilibrium are much more likely to
destroy it. High-trust is thus \more dicult to sustain."
1.2. Related Literature
We are certainly not the rst to point out that without security swivel-trays an element of
trust is needed for most transactions to take place. Arrow (1972, p. 357) notes that \Virtually
every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction
conducted over a period of time." In the absence of \instantaneous exchange," an element of
trust is required.
Arrow (1972) goes on to comment on the path-breaking study by Baneld (1958) of the
devastating eects of the lack of trust on a \backwards" small community in southern Italy.
3Since the term \partial identication" has been used before (Phillips, 1989), it is useful to be precise as
to the meaning we give it here. The identication is partial in the sense that we cannot rule out that two
equilibria corresponding to two sets of parameters entail a negative correlation between trust levels and size
of individual transactions. Therefore, while a positive correlation excludes the possibility of a switch across
multiple equilibria with unchanged parameters, the observation of a negative correlation is inconclusive.Equilibrium Trust 4
Following Baneld (1958) a large literature has blossomed on the roots and eects of the lack,
or presence, of trust.
The literature is way too large and varied to attempt even a reasoned outline here, let alone
a survey. We conne ourselves to recalling how Putnam (1993) documents the heterogeneous
levels of \social capital" in dierent regions of Italy and its role in fostering growth. A couple
of years later, Fukuyama (1995) published an inuential monograph concerning the positive
role of trust in large rms and hence economic growth.4
We also selectively recall the contributions by Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and more recently Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2004), Sapienza, Toldra, and Zingales (2007) and Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso (2009).5 These
studies all document in a variety of ways how the presence of trust is correlated with desirable
economic outcomes.
The departure from standard preferences that we postulate here can also be traced back
a long way. Vernon Smith (1998), citing experimental evidence draws out the distinction
that goes back to Adam Smith (1759, 1776) between \moral" and \selsh" preferences. It is
interesting to go back this far since in this reading of Smith (1759), \moral sentiments" seem
to t well the idea of an \extra entry" in agents' utilities that capture their regard for the
\fortune of others." In essence, we take the same approach here. Arrow (1972) contains an
illuminating discussion of the dierent ways in which non-selsh motives can enter agents'
preferences.
Much more recently Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) explore the eects of \ethical" social
feed-back mechanisms not unlike the one we consider here, and their eects on the equilibria
of voting models.6 Horst and Scheinkman (2006) are concerned with the general theoretical
problems of models with social feed-back variables, particularly with the (far from trivial)
issues that arise in proving the existence of equilibrium in general in this class of models.
Dixit (2003) and Tabellini (2008) are both theoretical contributions to the literature on
4It is important to note at this point that the literature documenting the positive impact of \social capital"
or \trust" on income, wealth and growth rates also includes some notable skeptics. To our knowledge, the
most prominent one is Solow (1995), who in turn cites evidence from Kim and Lau (1994) and Young (1994).
For a survey of much of the literature on trust and social capital we cite here, including an account of the
debate we have just mentioned, see Sobel (2002).
5Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000), Irlenbusch (2006) and Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso
(2009) focus on experimental set-ups.
6Blume (2004) investigates the eect of \stigma" in a dynamic model.Luca Anderlini and Daniele Terlizzese 5
trust. Their main focus is on the dierential eects of distance and society's size on the
sustainability of trust. In both cases the possibility of equilibrium phenomena that address
the issue of trust is due to the dynamic, repeated nature of the interaction between agents.
In our model, play only takes place once, and trusting and trustworthy equilibrium behavior
can be traced directly back to our non-standard preferences generating the social feed-back
we have described above.
Finally, the theoretical literature on repeated interactions, from which we purposedly stay
away, is also vast. We simply refer the interested reader to the recent monograph by Mailath
and Samuelson (2006) which also has a comprehensive and up-to-date list of references.
1.3. Plan of the Paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model
in detail and make precise what constitutes an equilibrium in our set up. In Section 3 we
characterize the set of possible equilibria of the model. In Section 4 we highlight how high
and low trust equilibria may arise from either dierences in the fundamental parameters of
the model, or a switch across multiple equilibria supported by the same set of parameter
values. In this section, we also spell out the identiable characteristics of high and low trust
equilibria in these two cases, and we proceed to characterize transaction volumes and welfare
properties of the dierent equilibria. Section 5 provides a re-interpretation of the socially
generated component of cheating costs as stemming from an enforcement technology with
limited resources available. In Section 6 we carry out a robustness analysis of low and high
trust equilibria in the multiple equilibria regime. Finally, Section 7 briey concludes.
For ease of exposition, all proofs have been relegated to an Appendix.
2. Set-Up
2.1. The Model
There is a continuum of risk-neutral players of mass 2 uniformly distributed on [0;2]. All
players i 2 [0;2] face equal and independent chances of playing on the oer side, and on the
receiver side. We refer to the former as O agents and the latter as R agents. So there is a
unit mass of both i 2 O and i 2 R agents after the realization of this rst draw.
The O and R agents are then randomly matched to form a unit mass of pairs. The only
thing that is of consequence here is that an O agent should not know the \cost of cheating"Equilibrium Trust 6
(to be dened very shortly) of the agent she is matched with.7
Each agent O makes an oer x 2 [0;1] to the R agent in her match. The oer generates
a total surplus of 2x to be split equally between O and R if the transaction goes through
without \cheating" on the part of R.8 So, if R does not cheat, an oer of x generates a payo
of x for both O and R.
It is the R agent in the match who decides whether to cheat or not. After receiving an
oer x from the O agent in the match, R may decide to cheat and grab the entire surplus 2x
instead of abiding by what the splitting procedure suggests. However, if she cheats, R will
also suer a cost c.9 Therefore, R will cheat if 2x c > x or equivalently x > c, and will not
cheat otherwise.10
The total cost of cheating c has two components. One depends on the exogenously given
\type" of the R agent and the other is determined by the behavior of other agents in the
model.
For simplicity, we assume that there are just two types of R agents, \high" (H) and \low"
(L).11 The exogenous component of the cost of cheating is tL 2 (0;1) for type L and tH 2
(0;1) for type H, with tL < tH. The proportion of type H is denoted by p 2 (0;1) throughout.
The component of c that is \socially determined" is the same for all players.12 Let s be
the proportion of R agents who do not cheat. We simply set the social component of the
cheating cost to equal s and we take the two components of the cheating cost to combine in
7Since we do not consider repeated interaction, the other details of the matching process are completely
inessential. It should also be noted that, given the simplicity of our set up, it is easy to model our matching
process in an eective way avoiding all the well known technical problems that can arise in the random
drawing and matching of continuous populations of players. We omit the details. For a recent contribution
and a substantial set of references see Due and Sun (2007)
8The fact that the surplus is split equally simplies our calculations, but is completely inessential.
9Note that we are assuming that R has the choice of whether to cheat or not even when x = 0. If she
cheats after an oer equal to zero, her payo will therefore be  c. However, when x = 0, there is, so to
speak, nothing to grab. Hence, an alternative would be to assume that R does not have a choice of whether
to cheat or not when x = 0. Proceeding as we do simplies the analysis but does not impact the results.
10Our implicit assumption that when R is indierent she will necessarily not cheat simplies the analysis
but is in fact without loss of generality. In equilibrium, the cheating set dened here and in (2) below must
be open even if it were allowed in principle to be closed. The reason is that if it were not, then the optimal
oer of O agents could not be dened because the acceptance set would have to be open.
11The overall avor of our results easily generalizes to an world with any nite number of types. Many of
our results also have analogues in a world with a continuum of types. We proceed in this way since one of
our main aims is to keep the set up as simple as we possibly can.
12Again, this is the simplest way of proceeding. One could imagine heterogeneous cost \sensitivities" to
the behavior of others, and this could easily be accommodated in our set up.Luca Anderlini and Daniele Terlizzese 7
a linear way.13 For an R agent of type  2 fL;Hg, the total cost of cheating if a proportion
s of transactions go through without cheating is given by
c(;s;) = t + (1   )s (1)
with  2 (0;1) a parameter that measures (inversely) the social sensitivity of the agents' cost
of cheating.
As we have already remarked, the social component s of c is a critical ingredient of our
model. We think of it as embodying the inuence of social norms on individual behavior.
When fewer people in society cheat, those who do are in some sense further away from the
social norm, and this has a \moral cost."
The eect of s on c can also be re-interpreted as a cost stemming from an enforcement
technology. As fewer people cheat, for given resources devoted to enforcement, the probability
that a cheater is \caught" increases, thus increasing the expected cost of cheating. We pursue
this interpretation more formally in Section 5 below.
2.2. Equilibrium Denition
An equilibrium in our model is just a Nash equilibrium of the game we have described: a
strategy prole  describing for every player which oer she makes in her O role, and which
oers she cheats and does not cheat on when she is in her R role, and such that no player
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate.
A strategy prole  assigns (in a measurable way) two numbers to every player i 2 [0;2]:
the oer x(i) 2 [0;1] that i will make if she is chosen to be an O agent, and a cheating cut-o
value z(i) 2 [0;1] indicating that she will cheat if and only if she receives an oer strictly
above z(i) when she is chosen to be an R agent.14 Notice that once a prole  is given, a
value of s is also given since the expected proportion of transactions that will not involve
cheating is determined directly by .15
We begin the analysis of the players' maximization problem on the R side. Fix a , which,
13As with our other modeling choices, this is just the simplest way of proceeding.
14In principle, the players' cheating responses could be based on more than simple cut-o value. However,
it is easy to show that we can restrict strategy spaces in this way without loss of generality using a standard
weak-dominance argument.
15For each i 2 O the distribution z() of cut-o values across R agents and x(i) determine the probability
that i will be cheated by her partner. This is then averaged out across all O agents, to yield s.Equilibrium Trust 8
as we noted, also xes a value of s. Consider an R agent of type  2 fL;Hg. She will cheat
if and only if the oer x she receives satises
x > c(;s;) = t + (1   )s (2)
For given , and hence s, using (2) we can compute the mass of agents R who will not





0 if x 2 (c(H;s;);1]
p if x 2 (c(L;s;);c(H;s;)]
1 if x 2 [0;c(L;s;)]
(3)
For given , we can therefore write the expected payo of an O agent oering x as
xP(x;s) (recall that oering x, she gets a payo of x whenever she is not cheated). Hence




The solution to (4) is immediate to characterize. Since c(L;s;) < c(H;s;) < 1, the
solution to (4) depends on the comparison between
c(L;s;) and pc(H;s;) (5)
If c(L;s;) > pc(H;s;) then it is uniquely optimal to set x = c(L;s;) | the largest level
that ensures that no R agents cheat. If instead c(L;s;) < pc(H;s;) the unique solution
is to set x = c(H;s;) | the largest level that ensures that only R agents of type L cheat.
Finally if c(L;s;) = pc(H;s;), then an O agent is indierent between making an oer of
c(L;s;) and an oer of c(H;s;), and hence both values solve the maximization problem
(4).
Intuitively, increasing x increases (in jumps, because of the discrete nature of the types)
the probability that the oer will be cheated on. The trade o between increased payo
conditional on not being cheated on and the increase in the probability of cheating is what
determines the optimal behavior of O agents.
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agents.
Assumption 1. Tie Break: Whenever c(L;s;) = pc(H;s;), all O agents make an oer
of c(L;s;) which is not cheated on with probability one, rather than an oer of c(H;s;)
which is cheated on by all R agents of type L.
For ease of exposition, form now on, when we say that \x solves (4)" we will mean a
solution that complies with the tie-breaking rule posited here.
Assumption 1 makes the behavior of all O agents uniquely determined for any parameter
values and any level of s, substantially simplifying the analysis.
Note that the behavior that Assumption 1 postulates can be interpreted as the result of
\lexicographic" risk-aversion of the O agents (added to their basic risk-neutrality). Whenever
expected values are equal (and only then), random variables with a lower risk are preferred.
In particular, when c(L;s;) = pc(H;s;), the sure payo of c(L;s;) will be preferred to
a random payo equal to 0 with probability 1   p and to c(H;s;) with probability p.
Assumption 1 simplies our analysis since it rules out, for parameter congurations sup-
porting multiple equilibria, a mixed equilibrium that is \intermediate" between the two that
we will focus on. This equilibrium is \between" the two remaining ones, and its presence
would not aect our qualitative conclusions in any way.16 We will remark again informally
on how the intermediate equilibrium would change some of the details as we go along.
We can now provide a working denition of what constitutes an equilibrium in our model.
Note that, using Assumption 1, the equilibrium behavior of all O agents is summarized by
a single number x 2 [0;1] | the solution to (4), which is the oer they all make to the R
agent they are each matched with. Of course, in equilibrium it must also be the case that
the value of s that appears in (4) is the correct one, as determined by the behavior of the R
agents given x. This justies the following denition of equilibrium, which we will work with
throughout the rest of the paper.
Denition 1. Equilibrium: An equilibrium is a pair (x;s) such that x solves (4) given s and
such that
P(x;s) = s (6)
16Details are available from the authors on request.Equilibrium Trust 10
Given what we know about the behavior of O agents, it is also easy to check that only
two possibilities are open for the value of s in any equilibrium. Setting an x such that both
types of R agent cheat is clearly never optimal. Hence in equilibrium it must be that either
s = 1 (and no cheating at all takes place), or s = p (and all R agents of type L cheat, and
all those of type H do not).
It follows easily that, in equilibrium, if s = 1 then x = c(L;1;) = tL + 1   , and
similarly if s = p then x = c(H;p;) = tH + (1   )p.
At this point, it is useful to crystallize some terminology for future use.
Denition 2. NC and LC Equilibria: An equilibrium (x;s) with s = 1 and x = c(L;1;)
| in which no R agents cheat | is called a No Cheating (NC) Equilibrium. An equilibrium




We can now work out the conditions under which the model has an NC equilibrium.
By denition in this case the equilibrium value of s is 1 | the probability of cheating is
in fact 0. Therefore
c(L;1;) = tL + 1    and c(H;1;) = tH + 1    (7)
We already know that in an NC equilibrium x = c(L;1;). Therefore, to conrm that
[c(L;1;); 1] is an equilibrium, we just need to check that the parameters of the model are
such that no O agent has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from oering x = c(L;1;)
(which gives her a payo of precisely c(L;1;) since no cheating takes place).
Deviating to an oer below c(L;1;) is never protable since it yields a lower payo
conditional on no cheating taking place, but obviously cannot decrease any further the prob-
ability that cheating occurs. Deviating to an oer above c(L;1;), and hence accepting that
R agents of type L will cheat, can yield at most a payo of pc(H;1;). In fact this is what
an O agent gets if she makes the largest oer that R agents of type H will not cheat upon,
taking as given the equilibrium value of s = 1. Hence, using (7), a necessary and sucientLuca Anderlini and Daniele Terlizzese 11
condition for an NC equilibrium to exist is that
tL + 1     p[tH + 1   ] (8)
3.2. LC Equilibrium
The conditions under which an LC equilibrium exists can be worked out in a parallel way.
By denition in this case, s = p. Hence
c(L;p;) = tL + (1   )p and c(H;p;) = tH + (1   )p (9)
As we noted above, in equilibrium when s = p it must be that x = c(H;p;). To ensure
that [c(H;p;);p] is an equilibrium we then need to check that the parameters of the model
are such that no O agent has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from oering x = c(H;p;),
which yields her an expected payo of pc(H;s;). With a logic that is by now familiar,
without loss of generality we can consider only the deviation to oering x = c(L;p;) |
the largest oer that will induce no cheating from either type of R agent, taking as given
the equilibrium value s = p. This deviation yields a payo of c(L;p;). Hence, using (9), a
necessary and sucient condition for the model to have an LC equilibrium is
p[tH + (1   )p]  tL + (1   )p (10)
3.3. Multiple and Unique Equilibria
It is useful to sum up and sharpen our picture of the possible equilibria of the model as a
function of the parameter quadruple (;p;tL;tH). Purely for the sake of simplicity, from
now on throughout the paper we restrict attention to quadruples away from the boundary of
[0;1]4, satisfying tH > tL. This dispenses us from having to consider separately some of the
boundary cases which would not add anything of interest to our results.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium Set: The equilibrium set of the model is guaranteed to be non-
empty, and can be of three types. A unique NC equilibrium, and in this case we say that we
are in the NCU regime. A unique LC equilibrium, in which case we will say that we are in
the LCU regime. Finally, there can be one LC and one NC equilibrium, and in this last case
we will say that we are in the LCNC or simply \multiple equilibria" regime.
If (8) is satised and (10) is not, then we are in the NCU regime. If (10) is satised and
(8) is not then we are in the LCU regime. Finally, if (8) and (10) are both satised then weEquilibrium Trust 12
are in the NCLC multiple equilibria regime.
Although a formal proof of Proposition 1 does not require much more than using some
of the observations we have already made, for the sake of completeness we present one in
the Appendix. Note that in the multiple equilibria regime only two equilibria are possible
because of our simplifying Assumption 1. As we mentioned above, without it we would get a
third \intermediate" equilibrium, in which the proportion of transactions not cheated upon
is strictly between p and 1.
The three equilibrium regimes of Proposition 1 are also all robust in the standard sense.
Proposition 2. Parametric Conditions: The set of parameter quadruples (;p;tL;tH) that
yield the NCU regime contains an open set. The same is true for the set of quadruples
yielding LCU, and for those yielding NCLC.
A formal proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. The simple argument behind it hinges
on the fact that (8) and (10) can be jointly rewritten as
(1   )p(1   p)  (ptH   tL)  (1   )(1   p) (11)
with the rst inequality corresponding to (10) and the second to (8). Since (1 )p(1 p) <
(1 )(1 p) for all  and p in the interval (0;1), we are guaranteed to nd robust parameter
congurations that support each of the three regimes.
We conclude this section with an observation, which we do not fully formalize purely for
reasons of space.17 Although they embody a level of trust s exactly equal to 1, the NCU
regime and the NC equilibrium of the NCLC regime are less special than might seem at rst
sight. The fact that they yield s = 1 rather than just a \high" s is an artifact of our choice
to consider only two types  2 fL;Hg of R agents in order to keep the model as simple as
possible.
Suppose that a small proportion of a third \very low" type were introduced, with the
exogenous component of the cost of cheating between 0 and tL. Then it would be easy to
check that the same parameters supporting an NC equilibrium in the two-types model would
yield an equilibrium in which only the \very low" type of R agents cheat. This is clearly
possible in a completely straightforward way whenever the model yields an NC equilibrium
17The details available from the authors upon request.Luca Anderlini and Daniele Terlizzese 13
which is \strict" in an appropriate sense. With this observation in mind, we will often
interpret the NC equilibria as \high trust" equilibria of a general kind, rather than focusing
specically on the fact that they display \full trust" (s = 1).
4. Societies With Dierent Levels of Trust
4.1. Dierences in Fundamentals vs. Equilibrium Switch
As we noticed above, dierences of trust levels across dierent societies are well documented.
Moreover, they are often seen to be correlated with (and sometimes held responsible for)
phenomena of primary economic importance like income levels and growth rates.
Our model can generate such dierences in two conceptually distinct ways.
The rst is when two societies are characterized by the same parameter quadruple gener-
ating the NCLC regime, the LC equilibrium is realized in one of the societies (the low trust
one) while the NC equilibrium is realized in the other (the high trust society). We refer to
this case as an equilibrium switch.
The second possibility is that dierent levels of trust across two societies reect the fact
that the two societies are characterized by dierent parameter quadruples, leading to dierent
levels of equilibrium trust. This in turn can happen in several dierent ways, as the two
quadruples can be in dierent regions of the parameter space supporting dierent equilibrium
regimes, or they might support the same equilibrium regime but with dierent equilibrium
trust levels. These cases are what we refer to as a dierence in the fundamentals.
Among the many ways in which a dierence in fundamentals can arise it is useful to
single out the case in which only the probability mass of the two types of R agents changes,
with all other parameters constant. This we refer to as a dierence in the distribution of
types. Specically, in one society the parameter quadruple is (;p;tL;tH), in the other is
(;p;tL;tH), and in both the LC equilibrium obtains.18 In the rst case the equilibrium trust
level is s = p and in the second it is s = p < s.
The distinction between dierences in the equilibrium level of trust that arise from an
equilibrium switch or from a dierence in fundamentals is more than a curiosity. These
two possibilities would in fact call for distinct policy stances from a Government seeking to
intervene to rectify a low level of trust. If the low trust level is the result of an equilibrium
switch, then the Government can attempt to engender a switch to a higher level of trust by
18So, clearly, both parameter quadruples must give rise to either the LCU or the NCLC regimes.Equilibrium Trust 14
re-focussing the expectations of the players. Convincing everyone in society that the level of
trust is s instead of s will do the job since this is capable of becoming a self-fullling prophecy.
If instead the low level of trust is due to a dierence in fundamentals then the only way
to ensure a high level of trust is to engineer a change in the parameters of the model. This
is conceptually and operationally dierent from a self-fullling change in beliefs, and likely
harder to achieve, although one might imagine a range of tools that vary from economic
incentives to educational programs based on \civic culture" that could be brought to bear.
The conceptual dierence between the two hypotheses, dierence in fundamentals versus
equilibrium switch, might also be of interest to scholars in other disciplines, such as political
science or sociology. In essence, a dierence in fundamentals points to dierent norms of
behavior being rooted in \anthropological" factors, while an equilibrium switch points in
the direction of random events triggering changes that become long-lasting because of self-
reinforcement mechanisms at work in society.
4.2. Trust and Transaction Levels
Suppose that we observe two societies, one with a high and the other with a low level of
trust. Can we identify whether the diering trust levels are due to an equilibrium switch or
to a dierence in the fundamentals?
Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is a qualied yes. As we mentioned in the introduction,
partial identication is in general possible, as there are some observations that allow us to
rule out an equilibrium switch.19 Full identication can be achieved if the range of possible
alternatives can be further restricted in an appropriate way. In particular, if we know that
the only dierences in the fundamentals that need to be considered are variations in the
distribution of types, then full identication becomes possible.
We begin with the general case, in which all possible variations in parameter quadruples
are considered.
The key to identication | partial or full, as the case may be | is the equilibrium level of
x, the oer made in equilibrium by all the O agents, which is also the equilibrium individual
transaction level.
The following two propositions make our claim precise for the general case
19See footnote 3 above.Luca Anderlini and Daniele Terlizzese 15
Proposition 3. Individual Transaction Levels | Equilibrium Switch: Let a parameter qua-
druple supporting the NCLC regime be given. Then the level of x in the associated NC
equilibrium is lower than the level of x in the associated LC equilibrium.
It follows that if the dierence in equilibrium trust between two societies is due to an
equilibrium switch in the sense of Subsection 4.1, then the equilibrium level of x is negatively
correlated with the equilibrium trust level.
When it comes to a dierence in fundamentals, in principle we should consider any pair of
equilibria, of the NC and/or LC type. For completeness, the following proposition examines
four cases. The bottom line is that when we allow for unrestricted dierences in fundamentals,
the relationship between dierences in the equilibrium trust level and the level of individual
transaction cannot be pinned down.
Proposition 4. Individual Transaction Levels | Change in Fundamentals: Fix arbitrarily
a parameter quadruple supporting an NC equilibrium. Then we can nd parameter quadru-
ples that support LC equilibria with individual transaction levels that can be both higher
and lower than in the given NC equilibrium.
Fix again arbitrarily a parameter quadruple supporting an NC equilibrium. Then we can
nd parameter quadruples that support NC equilibria with individual transaction levels that
can be both higher and lower than in the given NC equilibrium.
Fix arbitrarily a parameter quadruple supporting an LC equilibrium. Then we can nd
parameter quadruples that support NC equilibria with individual transaction levels that can
be both higher and lower than in the given LC equilibrium.
Finally, x again arbitrarily a parameter quadruple supporting an LC equilibrium. Then
we can nd parameter quadruples that support LC equilibria displaying a higher level of trust
and a lower level of individual transactions than in the original LC equilibrium, or a lower
level of trust and a higher level of individual transactions than in the original LC equilibrium.
The picture yielded by Propositions 3 and 4 | namely, partial identication | changes
considerably when we consider the case in which parameter dierences are restricted to be dif-
ferences in the distribution of types in the sense mentioned above. In this case the ambiguity
highlighted by Proposition 4 no longer holds and a denite conclusion can be reached about
the correlation between trust and the size of individual transactions following the dierence
in parameter values.
Proposition 5. Transaction Levels | Change in Distribution of Types: Consider two par-
ameter quadruples (;p;tL;tH) and (;p;tL;tH) with p >p, each giving rise to an LC equili-
brium with high (s = p) and low (s = p) trust levels respectively.Equilibrium Trust 16
Then the equilibrium level of x associated with (;p;tL;tH) is higher than the equilibrium
level of x associated with (;p;tL;tH).
It follows that if the dierence in equilibrium trust between two societies is due to a
dierence in fundamentals in the narrower sense of a dierence in the distribution of types,
then the equilibrium level of x is positively correlated with the equilibrium trust level.20
Formal proofs of Propositions 3, 4 and 5, which, again, consist of fairly simple algebra,
appear in the Appendix. Here, we elaborate on the intuition behind our results, beginning
with Proposition 4.
Recall that in any NC equilibrium the level of individual transaction is tL + 1  while
in any LC equilibrium it is given by tH + (1   )p. Proposition 4 is then the result of the
following observations. If we are allowed to vary all the parameters at will, the necessary and
sucient conditions (8) for an NC equilibrium to exist are compatible with any value of tL
+ 1  in (0;1). Similarly, if we are allowed to vary all the parameters at will, the necessary
and sucient conditions (10) for an LC equilibrium to exist are compatible with any value
of tH + (1   )p in (0;1).
The statement of Proposition 5 is an almost immediate consequence of the fact that in
any LC equilibrium the level of individual transactions is given by tH + (1   )p. Hence,
since all other parameters are kept constant, it must increase as p increases.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 requires some intermediate steps. Recall that in this
case we are concerned with a single parameter quadruple supporting the NCLC regime. Call
the level of individual transactions in the LC equilibrium xLC = tH + (1   )p. In the
LC equilibrium an O agent gets an expected payo of p xLC since with probability 1   p he
is cheated by the R agent he meets and ends up with a payo of zero. She could however
deviate and make the largest oer that will induce no cheating from any type of R agents.
Denote this by xD
LC, and observe that it must equal tL + (1 )p. By deviating, she would
get a payo equal to her oer for sure, hence her incentive constraint tells us that it must be
the case that p xLC  xD
LC.
Now consider the NC equilibrium associated with the given parameter quadruple. The
equilibrium level of individual transactions now is xNC = tL + 1 , since this is the largest
oer that will keep all R agents from cheating. The only dierence between xD
LC and xNC
20Note that once we x all parameters except for p, all NC equilibria are the same. Hence, since the eect
of a switch from LC to NC is already characterized by Proposition 3, the only relevant comparison is the one
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is in fact given by the higher level of equilibrium trust reected in xNC.21 This makes it
immediate to check that we have xD
LC > p xNC.
The two steps we have outlined give that p xLC  xD
LC and xD
LC > p xNC respectively,
which together immediately yield the claim of Proposition 3, namely xLC > xNC.
Before moving on, it is important to remark on the fact that the results in this subsection
are much less special than they seem at rst sight. While the algebra used here of course
rests on the specic features of our model, including for instance the linear form of the cost
of cheating, the basic logic behind the arguments generalizes considerably.
In particular, the logic of Proposition 3 relies on the fact that the set of types who cheat
in the two equilibria is dierent | it is larger in the low trust equilibrium than in the high
trust one. The incentive constraint of O agent in the low trust equilibrium is always going to
entail a comparison with what she can get if the oer is lowered so as to induce a larger set of
types not to cheat | a lower transaction (and hence payo) with a higher probability (xD
LC
above). This lower transaction in general is going to dier from her transaction level in the
high trust equilibrium (xNC above) only because of the eect of higher equilibrium trust, via
the socially determined component of the cost of cheating, but not the idiosyncratic one. The
critical comparison then becomes the one between the payo to the O agent in the high trust
equilibrium, but multiplied by the probability of not cheating in the low trust equilibrium (p
xNC above), and the deviating payo (xD
LC above). The idiosyncratic component of the cost
of cheating is the same in both cases, while the lower trust level multiplies both components
in the former (as a probability), but only enters the socially determined component of the
cost of cheating in the latter. So long as this is sucient to establish the analogue of xD
LC >
p xNC, the conclusion of Proposition 3 remains valid.
4.3. Trust and Aggregate Transactions
The key result of Subsection 4.2 above is that the level of trust and transaction level x are
negatively correlated in the case of an equilibrium switch.
On the other hand, a recurrent theme in the extant literature (see Subsection 1.2 above)
is that of a positive relationship between trust and income levels and/or growth rates. Does
it then follow that these ndings exclude switches across multiple equilibria as the root of
dierent trust levels in the societies that have been examined?
21The term 1    is multiplied by p in the case of xD
LC. It is not in the expression for xNC.Equilibrium Trust 18
The answer is no. And this is because the transaction level x in our simple model is not
the proper analogue of \GDP." The analogue of GDP in our simple model is clearly not the
equilibrium level of x (an \intensity" of activity index), but rather the equilibrium level of x
times the probability that no cheating occurs and hence that the surplus from the transaction
does in fact materialize (so, x times an \extensiveness" measure).
Because of the extreme simplicity of our set up, the aggregate level of transactions is
easily computed. In an LC equilibrium it will be the equilibrium value of x times p since a
proportion 1   p of transactions is cheated on. In an NC equilibrium, since all transactions
produce surplus because no one cheats, the equilibrium value of x is the appropriate measure
of aggregate transactions instead.
Our model predicts that the correlation between equilibrium trust and the aggregate level
of transactions is positive in the case of an equilibrium switch.
Proposition 6. Trust and Aggregate Transactions: Consider the equilibrium switch of Pro-
position 3, for a given parameter quadruple giving rise to the NCLC regime. Then, the
equilibrium aggregate level of transactions is lower in the associated LC equilibrium than in
the associated NC equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 6 is in the Appendix. As before, simple algebra is sucient to
formalize the argument.
4.4. Welfare
Despite its simplicity, in our model we can draw a meaningful distinction between \GDP" (the
aggregate level of transactions of Subsection 4.3) and welfare measures. This is because our R
agents cheat when they nd it optimal to do so. Hence, more cheating does not automatically
reduce aggregate welfare in society. A proper piece of welfare calculus is needed to draw a
conclusion.
Of course, welfare comparisons between to societies with dierent fundamentals which
| among other things | imply a variation in the players' preferences are not particularly
meaningful. Therefore, we conne ourselves to comparing welfare across the two dierent
equilibria when the model is in the NCLC regime.
Before proceeding any further we have to be precise about aggregate welfare. As seems
natural in this context, we focus on the utilitarian benchmark. The expected utilities of R
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(degenerate average) expected utility of O agents. Recall that each transaction of amount x
that is executed without cheating generates a payo of x for each side; hence a total surplus
of 2x. Each oer x that is cheated upon by the R agent instead produces a payo of 0 for
the O agent and a payo of 2x   c (with c the cost of cheating) for the R agent. It follows
easily that aggregate welfare in an NC equilibrium where all O agents oer xNC is equal to
2xNC. In an LC equilibrium the R agents of type L (who have mass 1 p) cheat while those
of type H do not. Hence in an LC equilibrium in which all O agents make an oer of xLC,
aggregate welfare is equal to p2xLC + (1   p)[2xLC   c(L;p;)]. Using (9) aggregate welfare
in this case can therefore also be written as 2xLC   (1   p)[tL + (1   )p].
The bottom line is that the natural welfare comparison between the high trust NC equi-
librium and the low trust LC equilibrium is in fact ambiguous.
Proposition 7. Aggregate Welfare in the NCLC regime: There exist parameter quadruples
that give rise to the NCLC regime and such that aggregate welfare is larger in the associated
NC equilibrium than in the associated LC equilibrium. There are also parameter quadruples
that give rise to the NCLC regime and such that aggregate welfare is lower in the associated
NC equilibrium than in the associated LC equilibrium.
The Appendix contains a formal proof of Proposition 7. As before, simple formal manipula-
tions are all that is required.
5. Enforcement
As we mentioned already, the component of the cost of cheating c that is socially determined
| via s | can be reinterpreted as arising from an enforcement technology with limited
resources for catching and punishing the R agents who cheat. This is quite dierent from
the social norm interpretation we gave before, but the formalisms are surprisingly close in
the two cases.
As previously, we seek to proceed in the simplest possible way.
Assume that there is an enforcement agency with resources k 2 [k;1].22 The parameter
k pins down the capacity of the enforcement mechanism in the sense that a mass k of R
agents can be checked and ned. Note that, for simplicity, we assume that the enforcement
22We take k to be a number strictly between 0 and 1. The convenience of assuming that k be bounded
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is perfectly targeted; no resources are wasted on R agents that do not cheat.23 A mass
minfk;1   sg of R agents who cheat is randomly caught and ned. A useful analogy is that
of checks for speeding on the highway. Only cars that are actually above the speed limit are
stopped, and when they are stopped they are ned. However, the number of cars that can in
fact be stopped and ned is limited by the capacity of the Police to deploy its patrol cars.
The speeding analogy is also useful to see intuitively how the mechanics of the social feed-
back on the cost of cheating work in this case. Given that the Police have a xed capacity for
stopping and ning speeding cars, if a large percentage of the cars on the road actually speed
it will be impossible for the Police to stop all of them. Other things equal, the probability of
being caught and ned will be lower when more cars actually speed. Conversely, when very
few cars actually speed, the xed capacity of the Police will ensure that many of them will
be caught. In fact, once the mass of speeding cars is equal or less than the Police capacity,
the probability of being caught for those speeding will be one.
It is convenient to normalize the size of the ne to be equal to one. The probability of








Since the ne is normalized to one, z is also the expected ne, or the expected cost of cheating,
coming from the enforcement mechanism.24
As we did previously, we assume that z is combined in a linear way with a cost of cheating
arising from the R agent's type.25 We then obtain that the total cost of cheating now is
c(L;s;) = tL + (1   )z and c(H;s;) = tH + (1   )z (13)
The logic of Section 3 applies to this reinterpretation of the model virtually unchanged.
Only NC and LC equilibria are possible. Condition (8) is still necessary and sucient for an
NC equilibrium to exist.
23Our results easily generalize to the case in which the proportion of enforcement resources that are targeted
towards the mass s of R agents that do not cheat is non-increasing in s.
24Note that since k  k > 0, we get that z = 1 whenever s = 1. See footnote 22 above.
25As before, this is just the simplest way of proceeding. It also yields immediate comparability with the
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When s = p, we must replace (9) with (13). Hence, condition (10) must be replaced by
p














which is now necessary and sucient for an LC equilibrium to exist.
Proposition 1 still holds provided that we replace condition (10) with condition (14).
Note next that if we set k = p(1   p) the new condition (14) coincides with the old
condition (10). Hence we can also conclude that, at least for an open interval of values of k
around p(1   p), Proposition 2 still holds.
It is then immediate to see that Propositions 3, 4, 5 and 6 are also still valid in this
reinterpretation of the model.
The basic conclusion of Proposition 7 | that the eect of an equilibrium switch on
aggregate welfare is ambiguous | is still valid in the case of enforcement we are considering
here. The details are somewhat dierent however. The part of the cost of cheating that
corresponds to the ne must now be treated dierently from the socially generated cost of
cheating in the social norms version of the model. The ne is a transfer from one agent
to another (from the R agent who cheats to the enforcement agency, whatever shape and
form it might take), and hence washes out of the aggregate welfare calculation, instead of
generating a net decrease in aggregate welfare as in the case of the of social norms version of
the model.26 Hence, it is easy to see that aggregate welfare in an LC equilibrium is given by
2xLC   (1   p)tL, with xLC now equal to (15) below.
It is interesting to track what happens to the features of an LC equilibrium as k changes.
We begin with the obvious observation that in the model with enforcement in an LC equilib-
rium the transaction level is equal to







since this is the largest oer that will induce the R agents of type H not to cheat. Hence, as
we track the LC equilibrium, an increase in k guarantees both an increase in the individual
transaction level, and an increase in aggregate transactions since the latter is just equal to
(15) multiplied by p.
26The idiosyncratic part of the cost of cheating obviously remains as beforeEquilibrium Trust 22
At this point, it would be tempting to use the model to investigate what is the optimal
level of resources devoted to enforcement.27 Following standard procedure, the latter would
be determined by comparing the marginal cost of increasing k with its marginal benet, i.e.
the marginal increase in the aggregate welfare of the LC equilibrium as k raises.28 However,
given the simplicity of our model, it would be hard to specify a suciently reliable marginal
cost function for k. Moreover, the measure of aggregate welfare we dened, though consistent
with the model, clearly reects our extremely stylized approach to the problem. On both
counts, it would be reckless to base detailed policy conclusion on the exercise.
There is however a case in which the conclusion that can be drawn is suciently strong
to deserve special attention in our view. This is what we turn to next.
The argument involves again the idea of an equilibrium switch that we discussed above.
Consider a parameter quadruple (;p;tL;tH) such that condition (8) that guarantees the
existence of an NC equilibrium is satised as a strict inequality. Note that this is equivalent
to (ptH   tL)=(1   ) < 1   p. Hence condition (14) that is necessary and sucient for an
LC equilibrium to exist is satised if and only if k is such that




Now consider the following policy question. We are given a quadruple (;p;tL;tH) such
that condition (8) is satised strictly. We are also told that society is in the LC equilibrium
and that k is equal (or below and very close) to the threshold level k(;p;tL;tH) given in
(16). We are also told that the marginal cost of an increase in k is nite. Lastly, we are
in a setting in which the policy-maker is interested in the aggregate transaction level | the
GDP measure of Subsection 4.3 above.29 The question then is whether we recommend a local
policy change | a small increase in k.
The answer must be \yes." The reason is simply that after the increase in k, condition
(14) will be violated. It then follows that the policy will force an equilibrium switch. The
small increase in k will ensure that society switches from the LC equilibrium to the only
27Note that in an NC equilibrium the question is not a very interesting one. Since s = 1, the enforcement-
generated component of the cost of cheating z in an NC equilibrium is equal to 1. Hence the optimal k is
simply k. See also footnote 22.
28Given (15) and the fact that aggregate welfare is computed as we discussed just above, the marginal
welfare increase is 2(1   )=(1   p) if k < 1   p and zero if k  1   p.
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remaining one | namely the NC equilibrium. Since the marginal cost of k is nite, a \small"
increase in k must carry a correspondingly \small" cost. However, by Proposition 6 there
will be a discrete jump up in the aggregate level of activity. Hence the policy change must
be worthwhile.
6. Robustness
Our next goal is to investigate whether the high and low trust equilibria have dierent ro-
bustness attributes | dierent degrees of resilience to small changes in the environment in
which they emerge.
There are many ways to proceed, as there are obviously many \robustness tests" that
one might devise. We proceed with the \myopic belief revision" analysis below for at least
three reasons. The rst is that in our view it ts well our motivation of investigating the
tension between \trusting beliefs" and \trusting behavior" that we mentioned above in the
introduction to the paper. The second is that it seems more novel in nature than some of the
alternatives | for instance payo-based adaptive dynamics (we return to this point briey
below). And last, but certainly not least, is that the analysis can be carried out in a very
simple way.
We return to the social norms version of the model, and, throughout this section, we
assume that the parameter quadruple is one that sustains the NCLC regime, so that both
equilibria are in fact possible. The question is whether one is more \likely" than the other in
some coherent sense of the word.
Imagine that the population of players is divided into two sets. A fraction q 2 (0;1) of
the players believes \myopically" that the NC equilibrium prevails.30 A fraction 1 q instead
believes that the LC equilibrium prevails. These subsets are decided before any draws that
determine the players' O and R roles, or their type H or L. Hence there are fractions q and
1   q of players with these beliefs in each possible role and type. For short, we will say that
a player or an agent \believes NC" or \believes LC," as appropriate.
The players' beliefs about which equilibrium prevails aect the socially determined com-
ponent of their cheating cost. The idiosyncratic component is given by their type as before.
Hence the O agents, can be partitioned in four sets: the H types who believe NC, the H
30The reason we call (as is standard) these beliefs \myopic" is that, as will be apparent shortly, they are
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types who believe LC, the L types who believe NC and the L types who believe LC. For these
sets, we get the following shares of the population with corresponding cheating costs
Population Share Cheating Cost
q p tH + 1     c1
(1   q)p tH + (1   )p  c2
q (1   p) tL + 1     c3
(1   q)(1   p) tL + (1   )p  c4
(17)
Since we are in the NCLC regime, (10) must be satised. Using this together with tH > tL,
we immediately get that
c1 > c2 > c3 > c4 (18)
Now consider an O agent who believes NC. Given her beliefs, she will nd it optimal to
make an oer of xNC = tL + 1   , just as in Subsection 3.1 above. Moreover, an O agent
who believes LC, just as in Subsection 3.2 above, will nd it optimal to make an oer xLC =
tH + (1   )p.
Using (17) and (18) we now can work out the probabilities that each of the oers xNC
and xLC will be cheated on.
Since xNC = c3, the R agents with costs of cheating equal to c1, c2 or c3 will not cheat
upon receiving the oer xNC. On the other hand the R agents with cost of cheating c4 will
nd it optimal to cheat on it. In sum, the R agents who believe LC and are of type L will
cheat upon receiving the oer xNC, while the other R agents will not. This pins down the
probability that an O agent who believes NC and hence oers xNC will be cheated on to be
equal to (1   q) (1   p).
Analogously, since xLC = c2, the R agents with costs of cheating equal to c1 or c2 will not
cheat upon receiving the oer xLC. On the other hand the R agents with costs of cheating
equal to c3 or c4 will nd it optimal to cheat on it. In sum, the R agents who are of type L,
irrespective of whether they believe NC or LC will cheat upon receiving the oer xLC, while
the other R agents will not. Hence, the probability that an O agent who believes LC and
hence oers xLC will be cheated on is equal to (1   p).
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with the myopic beliefs we assigned them to begin with. A natural mechanism to imagine
here is that if the former is larger the the latter, then the share of players with the given
myopic belief will go down while it will go up if the reverse is the case. In other words, if the
\empirical frequency" of cheating is dierent from what players expect, then in the aggregate
the share of the population that holds the given belief will change: it will go down if the
empirical frequency of cheating is larger than what the players expected and it will go up
if it is lower. The details of the adjustment rule are largely unimportant, so long as it is
\monotone" in the sense we have described, but to x ideas we will postulate a very simple
one.
Start with a proportion q0 of players who believe NC and a corresponding proportion of
players 1   q0 who believe LC. Time is discrete and runs as 0;1;:::;t;::: with the share of
NC believers at t denoted qt. Now suppose that all the players who believe NC who are in
fact cheated switch their belief to LC. This is an extreme assumption, but, after all, they
expect to be cheated with probability zero, and they are actually cheated by the R agent
they are matched with.31 In this extreme case we get
qt+1 = qt [1   (1   qt)(1   p)] (19)
From (19) it is immediate that as t becomes large qt converges to zero. Hence, in this
simple case, the fraction of the population of players who believe NC shrinks through time,
approaching zero as t goes to innity.
Before commenting further on the result, we reiterate that the same will clearly be true for
a very large class of dynamics that are monotone in the dierence between what the players
expect (believe NC or believe LC) and the empirical frequency of cheating.
The fact that qt ! 0 as t becomes large pins down the NC equilibrium as less robust than
the LC one. To see intuitively the general phenomenon that we are capturing here recall
that, critically, the players beliefs about the behavior of others aect their cost of cheating.
In other words, those players who believe in LC will have a lower cost of cheating than those
who believe in NC. In general, those players who believe in lower trust equilibria will have a
lower cost of cheating than those who believe in higher trust equilibria.
31To see that it is admissible to only consider the switch away from believing NC as driving the dynamics,
recall that the players who believe LC expect to be cheated with probability 1   p and are in fact cheated
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Now imagine that we \perturb" a high trust equilibrium by adding a small fraction of
players who believe that society is in a low trust equilibrium. Since the \invaders" have a
lower cost of cheating, they will cheat in situations in which the players who believe in the
high trust equilibrium do not. Hence, the overall frequency of cheating in society will go up.
Under \monotonic" belief dynamics, the population share of players who believe in the low
trust equilibrium will go up. This will set o another round of increase in cheating, and so
on.
The case of a low trust equilibrium being perturbed with an invasion by a small mass of
players who believe in a high trust equilibrium is a very dierent one. Notice that in this
case the proportion of R agents who cheat upon receiving the oer xLC (made by those O
agents who believe LC) does not depend on q | the fraction of players who believe NC. The
reason is that in the LC equilibrium the oer xLC | as is familiar by now | is the largest
oer that keeps the R agents of type H from cheating, given that they believe LC. Switching
some R agents of type H to believe in NC, will raise their cost of cheating, and hence will
not introduce any new cheaters. After the \invasion" by a small population of agents who
believe NC, the empirical frequency of cheating will remain unchanged, since the empirical
frequency of being cheated still equals the one expected by the O agents.
Before moving on, we mention briey another robustness exercise that we do not report in
any detail for reasons of space, but which also points in the direction of high trust equilibria
being less robust than low trust ones. The idea is to start again with some players who
myopically believe NC and some others who myopically believe LC, but to base the dynamics
of their respective shares of the population on the expected payos that accrue to each
combination of type (H or L) and myopic belief.32 In this case too, the results point in
the direction of low trust equilibria being more robust than low trust ones. Intuitively, the
players who believe LC have, other things equal, lower cheating costs and this gives them an
advantage in the payo based dynamics over the players who believe NC.
32There is a vast literature on learning/evolutionary game theory that concerns dynamics related to the
ones we are sketching out here, and is also related to our previous exercise. This is clearly not the place
to even attempt a survey, but we refer the interested reader to the two monographs by Weibull (1995) and
Samuelson (1997) and the many references cited there.Luca Anderlini and Daniele Terlizzese 27
7. Summary and Conclusions
Our main purpose was to explore the tension between trusting beliefs and consequent trusting
behavior, and the incentives to cheat by requiring that the level of trust in society be the
fraction of transactions that are not cheated upon in equilibrium.
Our results demonstrate that a simple social feed-back mechanism is sucient to generate
a rich pattern of possible equilibria that shed light on the issue of equilibrium trust. We set
up a simple static model in which one side of a transaction can cheat and walk away with
the entire surplus, but must suer a cost of cheating with a socially generated as well as
an idiosyncratic component. The socially generated component captures the idea that social
norms will make it more costly to cheat when a smaller fraction of the population engages in
cheating behavior.
Our ndings point to the fact that there are two main possible sources of dierences in
trust levels across societies. One is the multiplicity of equilibria, that can arise for given fun-
damental parameters. The other is a dierence in the fundamental parameters themselves.
Surprisingly, the two regimes are empirically partially identiable in general, and fully iden-
tiable under some further restrictions. The key variable to identication is the equilibrium
size of individual transactions, which must be negatively correlated with the equilibrium level
of trust when the source of dierent trust levels are multiple equilibria.
The positive relationship between trust and aggregate income levels (our static model has
little to say about growth of course) that has been claimed in the literature is not negated
by the negative correlation associated with a switch across multiple equilibria. The reason is
that, in this case, when individual transaction levels go down, the frequency of transactions
increases.
Interestingly, since our agents cheat if and only if they nd it optimal to do so, the
relationship between aggregate income and aggregate welfare is not unambiguous in our
model. As society switches across multiple equilibria with high and low trust, aggregate
welfare could go up as well as down.
Our model can also be reinterpreted as one with standard selsh preferences, in which
an enforcement agency uses limited resources to catch and punish those agents who cheat.
Because of the limited resources devoted to enforcement, when the fraction of agents who
cheat is higher, it is less likely that cheating agents are caught. This produces a social feed-
back mechanism that is the same as the one in the social norms case, and hence all the sameEquilibrium Trust 28
results are valid in this reinterpretation of the model.
Finally, we report explicitly on one robustness exercise which indicates that high-trust
equilibria are more vulnerable than low-trust ones. Introducing a small fraction of agents
who believe in the low-trust equilibrium in a population of agents who believe and play
according to the high-trust one can destroy the high-trust equilibrium. The reason is that
the invaders have a lower cost of cheating precisely they believe in the low-trust equilibrium
| a less demanding social norm. This pushes up the fraction of transactions that are cheated
on, which in turn causes the agents who believe in the high-trust equilibrium to revise down
their beliefs.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: To see that the equilibrium set is always not empty, suppose rst that
tL  ptH (A.1)
In this case, inequality (8) is clearly satised and hence an NC equilibrium exists. Next, suppose that (A.1)
is violated. Then the middle term of (11) is positive. Since the rst term in (11) is positive and strictly less
than the third term in (11), one or both of the inequalities in (11) must be satised. Since the rst inequality
in (11) is the same as (10) and the second is the same as (8), we must have that either an LC or an NC or
both equilibria exist. Hence the equilibrium set is always not empty.
To see that only the three NCU LCU and LCNC regimes are possible, we only need to argue that there
are no equilibria other than the LC and the NC ones.
As we noted in the text, the solution to (4) consistent with Assumption 1 is unique and can only take
the values x = c(L;s;) or x = c(H;s;). Together with (6), this is sucient to prove the claim.
Proof of Proposition 2: We have already noted that the rst inequality in (11) is the same as (10) and
the second is the same as (8).
Hence, any parameter quadruple such that
(ptH   tL) < (1   )p(1   p) (A.2)
must yield the NCU regime. Hence the set of parameter quadruples that yield the NCU regime must contain
an open set.
Moreover, any parameter quadruple such that
(1   )(1   p) < (ptH   tL) (A.3)
must yield the LCU regime. Hence the set of parameter quadruples that yield the LCU regime must contain
an open set.
Lastly, clearly
(1   )p(1   p) < (1   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and hence for an open set of parameter quadruples we can be sure that
(1   )p(1   p) < (ptH   tL) < (1   )(1   p) (A.5)
Therefore, we can be sure that the set of parameter quadruples that yield the NCLC regime also contains an
open set.
Proof of Proposition 3: By assumption, the given parameter quadruple supports the NCLC regime.
Hence, (11) must be satised. The level of individual transactions in the NC equilibrium is tL + 1   ,
while in the LC equilibrium it is tH + (1   )p. Hence it suces to show that (11) implies
tL + 1    < tH + (1   )p (A.6)
Consider the rst inequality in (11). Divide both sides by p and rearrange to obtain
tL
p
+ 1     tH + (1   )p (A.7)
which, given that 0 < p < 1 immediately yields (A.6).
Lemma A.1: Fix any arbitrary x 2 (0;1). Then there exist parameter quadruples that satisfy (8). This
ensures that an NC equilibrium exists, and such that the individual transaction level in the associated NC
equilibrium (given by xNC = tL + 1   ) is in fact equal to the arbitrarily given x.
Proof: The claim is obvious by inspection of (8). Simply x  and tL so as to ensure that xNC = x, as
required. Then x an arbitrary xH 2 (xL;1), and nally pick p suitably small so that (8) is satised.
Lemma A.2: Fix any arbitrary x 2 (0;1). Then there exists parameter quadruples that satisfy (10). This
ensures that an LC equilibrium exists, and such that the individual transaction level in the associated LC
equilibrium (given by xLC = tH + (1   )p) is in fact equal to the arbitrarily given x.
Proof: The claim is obvious by inspection of (10). One way to see this is to observe that we can pick  and
p arbitrarily close to 1, and ensure that xLC = x as required by choosing the appropriate level of tH. Picking
xL suciently small is then sucient to ensure that (10) is met.
Proof of Proposition 4: To avoid ambiguity we will refer to the rst second, third and fourth paragraphs
of the statement of Proposition 4 as A, B, C, and D respectively.
A is an immediate consequence of Lemma A.2. B and C are immediate consequences of Lemma A.1.
To prove D, proceed as follows. Let an arbitrary parameter quadruple (;p;tL;tH) such that (10) is
satised and let the individual transaction level in the associated LC equilibrium be xLC = tH + (1   )p.
We need to show that we can nd two parameter quadruples as follows. A quadruple (0;p0;t0
L;t0
H) such
that (10) is satised, p0 > p and x0
LC = 0t0
H + (1 0)p0 < xLC, and nally a quadruple (00;p00;t00
L;t00
H) such
that (10) is satised, p00 < p and x00
LC = 00t00
H + (1   00)p00 > xLC.
To construct (0;p0;t0
L;t0
H) starting from (;p;tL;tH) we can increase p by a small amount " > 0, while
decreasing tH by a small amount 2"(1 )=, so that overall individual transaction level decreases as required.
If we then decrease tL by the same amount as tH, it is immediate that the new quadruple (0;p0;t0
L;t0
H) must
in fact satisfy (10), as required.
To construct (00;p00;t00
L;t0
H0) starting from (;p;tL;tH), we can decrease p by an an arbitrarily small
amount " > 0, and set t00
H arbitrarily close to 1. By inspection, for " suciently small and t00
H suciently
close to 1, the individual transaction level will increase and (10) will be satised, as required.Equilibrium Trust 30
Proof of Proposition 5: In the low trust equilibrium the individual transaction level is tH + (1   )p.
In the high trust equilibrium the individual transaction level is tH + (1 )p. The claim is then immediate
from the fact that p > p.
Proof of Proposition 6: Since the parameter quadruple gives rise to the NCLC regime, (11) must hold.
The second inequality in (11), together with the fact that p < 1 immediately gives that
p[tH + (1   )p] < tL + 1    (A.8)
Recall that xLC = tH + (1 )p and xNC = tL + 1 , and that the aggregate transaction levels in
the LC and NC equilibria are pxLC and xNC respectively. Hence (A.8) proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 7: Aggregate welfare in the NC equilibrium is given by
WNC = 2(tL + 1   ) (A.9)
while aggregate welfare in the LC equilibrium is given by
WLC = 2[tH + (1   )p]   (1   p)[tL + (1   )p] (A.10)
Since the parameter quadruples we are concerned with all give rise to the NCLC regime, (11) must hold.
Notice next that, provided that tH and tL are suitably close to each other, (11) is compatible with
quadruples that have a value of p arbitrarily close to 1. By inspection of (A.9) and (A.10) in this case we
must have that WLC > WNC.
It remains to show that for some parameter quadruples that satisfy (11) we can have that WNC > WLC.
Notice that, again provided that tH and tL are suitably close to each other, (11) is compatible with quadruples
that have a value of p arbitrarily close to 0. By inspection of (A.9) and (A.10) in this case we must have that
WNC > WLC.
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